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An Employer's Conscience after Hobby Lobby and the
Continuing Conflict between

Women's Rights and Religious Freedom
SarahM Stephens

Women work. Almost half of the United States workforce is
composed of women, and among professional and technical occupations,
women make up a majority of the workforce.' Most women who work,
about three-quarters, do so full-time,2 and "[w]omen are the primary or sole3
breadwinners in nearly 40 percent of families with children."
Notwithstanding their contributions to and broad participation in the
American workplace, women continue to face discrimination on the basis
of deeply entrenched cultural norms which limit the place of women in
society.
Gender equality, whether in the workplace or elsewhere in society,
remains particularly elusive as to issues related to female reproduction,
including women's unique healthcare needs, and the stereotypical female
role in childrearing and caregiving. The standard for the 'ideal' worker is
still based around heterosexual male norms which presuppose a worker who
will be devoted full-time to the performance of his job duties without the
need to take time off for childrearing or family responsibilities. However,
women are usually the primary caregivers in families; whereas about 40
percent of women have taken a significant amount of time off from work to
care for a family member, only about 24 percent of fathers have done so.4
Where women have been able to conform to the male norm, they have
made great strides towards equality in the workplace. Where women
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, DATA FERRETIT, Dec. 2014,
http://thedataweb.rm.census.gov/ftp/cpsftp.html.
2
1d.
' Listening to Mothers: The Experiences of Expecting and New Mothers in the
Workplace, DATA BRIEF (Nat'l P'ship for Women and Families, Washington D.C.),
Jan. 2014, at 2, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplacefairness/pregnancy-discrimination/listening-to-mothers-experiences-of-expectingand-new-mothers.pdf [hereinafter, Nat'l P'ship for Women and Families].
' Eileen Patten, On Equal Pay Day, Key FactsAbout the Gender Pay Gap, PEW
14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact(Apr.
CENTER
RESEARCH
tank/2015/04/14/on-equal-pay-day-everything-you-need-to-know-about-thegender-pay-gap.
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cannot or will not conform to the male ideal worker standard, such as when
a woman becomes a mother or has to take on family responsibilities, they
are often viewed through a gendered lens thereafter, to detrimental result.
This is true even when women work through their pregnancies and return to
work afterwards.5
Career gaps and latent sex discrimination against women, and
mothers in particular, contribute to the gender pay gap and the "motherhood
penalty," along with an increasing number of claims of discrimination,
despite decades-old statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination in
employment. For example, women working full-time make only about
"78.6 cents for every dollar a man makes[,]" even controlling for other
variables, 6 and women with children still earn "about 5-6% less than
women without children."'7 Women, who return to work after having a
child, report experiencing bias due to perceptions about their ability or
commitment to return to work, with a resulting loss in opportunities, hours,
8
and responsibilities.
According to statistics published by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pregnancy discrimination claims have
increased steadily over the last 15 years. 9 As a result, the EEOC's strategic
enforcement plan adopted in December 2012 identifies "accommodating
pregnancy-related limitations under the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act (ADAAA) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)"
as a priority area for enforcement.'" Women's particular healthcare needs
have historically been, and continue to be, distinguished from the public
market sphere and categorized as belonging in the private recesses of
society." Perhaps this can partially explain why, in the past several years,
there have been numerous legislative efforts to restrict women's access to

5Nat'l P'ship for Women and Families, supranote 3, at 1.
6 The Wage Gap by State for Women Overall 2014, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW
CENTER (Sept. 17, 2015), http://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Wage-gap2015-final.pdf
I Ipshita Pal & Jane Waldfogel, Re- Visiting the Family Gap in Pay in the United
States (Columbia Population Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-02, 2014),
http://cupop.columbia.edu/publications/2014.
8 Nat'l P'ship for Women and Families, supranote 3, at 1, 3-4.
9
See Pregnancy DiscriminationChargesEEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY
2011, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfin (last
visited June 14, 2015).
" EEOC, US. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission StrategicEnforcement
PlanFY 2013-2016, 1, 10 (2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf.
11 AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY xiii (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991).
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fundamental reproductive healthcare in the United States,' 2 as well as
extensive legal challenges to attempt to expand women's access to
reproductive healthcare through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA). Proponents of legislative restrictions on women's reproductive
healthcare rights and challengers to the contraceptive mandate of the ACA
ground their arguments in claims of religious freedom. 3 Those challenges
came to a head in the Supreme Court's ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.'

4

In Hobby Lobby, the Court ruled that Hobby Lobby, as a privately
owned corporation, has the right to refuse to comply with the ACA's
mandate that health insurance offered to employees make certain
contraceptives available.' 5 Hobby Lobby objected to the provision of four6
particular contraceptives, which it erroneously denoted as "abortifacients"'
and argued that offering an insurance policy which covered those particular
contraceptives violated its rights under the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)."7
The Court, ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby, held that the ACA's
contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the exercise of religion
provided for in RFRA and the mandate is not the least restrictive means of
furthering the government's interest.' 8 "For the first time, the Supreme
Court exempted for-profit businesses from employee-protective law in the
name of religion."19 The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby singled out
Sarah M. Stephens, The Search for Authenticity and the Manipulation of
Tradition. Restrictions on Women's Reproductive Rights in the United States and
Egypt, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 325, 327 (2013).
12

13See Burwell
"'

v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).

See generallyBurwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

1Id. at 2785. The ACA does not, on its face, "require insurance plans to cover
contraception." George J. Annas et al., Money, Sex, and Religion-The Supreme
Court's ACA Sequel, 371 NEw ENG. J. MED. 862, 862 (2014). Rather, the ACA
requires coverage of preventative women's healthcare "without cost sharing by
patients." Id The Institute of Medicine used "neutral scientific and medical
criteria to" determine that preventative care coverage should include all 'TDAapproved contraceptive methods." Id.
16 See Sarah M. Stephens, At the End of Our Article 11 Rope: Why We Still Need
the EqualRights Amendment, 80 BROOK. L. REv. 397, 424, n. 169 (2015).
17 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62 (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2015), amended by Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§2000cc-5 (2015) (amending "RFRA's definition of the 'exercise ofreligion"')).
18 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80. The Court did not reach Hobby Lobby's
First Amendment argument. Id. at 2785.
19 Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation's Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated,128 HARv. L. REv. F. 24, 28 (2014).
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women's reproductive healthcare by stating, "[t]his decision concerns only
the contraceptive mandate and should not be understood to hold that all
insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or blood transfusions,
must necessarily fall if they conflict with an employer's religious beliefs."2
The Supreme Court broke from First Amendment and RFRA
precedent in Hobby Lobby by accommodating a for-profit employer's
request for a religious accommodation to female employees' statutory
entitlement to reproductive healthcare. The Court's significant expansion of
religious liberty doctrine in Hobby Lobby invites businesses to seek
exemptions from nondiscrimination laws such as Title VII, the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as
other laws which provide workplace protections to women, such as the
Family and Medical Leave Act, by arguing that enforcement of those laws
conflict with corporate religious beliefs. Therefore, the Hobby Lobby
decision will directly bear on not only the specific issue before the court
related to the ACA's health insurance mandate, but also may have broader
ramifications for women's employment protections in the context of
motherhood and pregnancy. By opening the door for more discrimination
against mothers, the decision exacerbates gender discrimination in the
workplace more generally.
This Article examines the ongoing conflict between women's rights
and religious liberty interests through the lens of the Hobby Lobby decision
by calling into question the Supreme Court's decision in that case,
identifying the danger to current antidiscrimination law created by the
Court's reasoning, and arguing that antidiscrimination laws protecting
women's rights in the workplace should survive a post-Hobby Lobby RFRA
challenge. The Article begins in Part I, putting this topic in context by
explaining the origins of prohibitions against sex discrimination in
employment and the protections they have provided since their enactment
and then examines well-established religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws found in statutory and case law. Part H reviews the
majority reasoning in Hobby Lobby within the anti-discrimination
framework and explores how the decision in that case could expand current
religious exemptions. Part HI analyzes whether an employer can use RFRA
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2758. Although outside the scope of this article, the
Court's opinion also appears to violate the Establishment Clause precedent by
favoring religion, as opposed to the absence of belief, and specifically mainstream
Christianity. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman,
Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the
Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014). Here, the majority
opinion in Hobby Lobby specifically points out that medical procedures objected to
on religious grounds by Jehovah's witnesses would be covered despite their
religious beliefs. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
20
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as a shield to defend itself against discrimination claims brought by or on
behalf of employees, and concludes that, while an employer can do so, a
RFRA defense should fail when applied to anti-discrimination laws,
notwithstanding the Hobby Lobby decision. Part IV cautions against the
expansion of the corporate religious liberty interest and employer
conscience exemption created in Hobby Lobby. Part V concludes.
Throughout the Article, the role of legislation and case law examining or
prohibiting workplace discrimination against women based on their
reproductive capacity are used as the case study for the impact of the postHobby Lobby legal landscape.
I. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FROM SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND
EMPLOYER EXEMPTIONS PRE-HOBBY LOBBY
A. Sex DiscriminationProhibitionsin the Workplace

"[T]he U.S. Supreme Court created the protected class idea" more
than 75 years ago "when it suggested that 'prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition' that calls for a 'more
searching judicial inquiry' on behalf of groups that are more likely to
"As the protected class
experience state-sponsored discrimination."21
doctrine developed," it came to primarily protect particular classes of
people who were readily identifiable as having suffered a history of
disenfranchisement and discrimination (i.e., those discriminated against on
the basis of race, national origin, or sex), and it moved from constitutional
theory to statutory entitlement.22 This Part describes current federal law
protections against sex discrimination in the workplace.

Nancy Levit, Changing Workforce
Protected Class Approach, 16 LEWIS &
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
Coenen, The FutureofFootnoteFour,41
21

Demographics and the Future of the
CLARK L. REV. 463, 467 (2011) (citing
304 U.S. 141, 153 n. 4 (1938)); Dan T.
GA. L. REV. 797, 798-799 (2007).

Nancy Levit, supra note 21, at 467. "Under our constitutional system, courts
stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are
non-conforming victims ofprejudice and public excitement." Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940). In the private employment context, federal protection
has been extended to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and
genetic information, among other protections. See The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2015); see also The
22

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2015), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-325 (2008); see also The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-2000ff-11 (2015).
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1. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 put into place one of the
23
prohibitions against sex discrimination in the workplace.
federal
first
Title VII arose from the Civil Rights movement and was drafted and
debated as a prohibition against race discrimination in the workplace.24 The
day before the bill went to a vote in the House of Representatives,
Representative Howard Smith introduced a floor amendment to include the
prohibition against sex discrimination.25 As a result, there is a limited
legislative record of how this additional prohibition was meant to be
interpreted. However, the record is not completely devoid of instruction.
There was some debate on the prohibition against sex discrimination which
reflected "an understanding of Title VII's sex provision as a check on
employment practices that reflected and reinforced traditional conceptions
of men's and women's roles."26
Early interpretations of Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition
focused on the concept of the protected trait and explored what types of
disparate treatment were prohibited by the Act. In order to prove
discrimination, in the absence of direct evidence, a woman was forced to
prove that she was treated less favorably than a man who was similarly
situated in every way but his sex.27 Cases where the discrimination was
based on a gender-related condition, such as pregnancy, or where a woman
was harassed based on her sex, were not believed to violate Title VII
because they related to conditions apart from biological sex. 8
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2015). The
first federal prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace was the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, which aimed to abolish wage disparity based on sex. 29 U.S.C. §§
201-219 (2015).
24 Cary Franklin, Inventing the "TraditionalConcept" of Sex Discrimination, 125
HAR. L. REV. 1307, 1317-18 (2012).
25 Sarah M. Stephens, What Happens Next? Will Protection Against Gender
Identity and Sexual Orientation Workplace Discrimination Expand During
President Obama's Second Term?, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.
365, 371 (2013). Some say that Howard Smith was "a staunch opponent of the
bill[]" and hoped that by "adding 'sex' to the list of impermissible bases for
employment discrimination[,]" he would be able to undermine the bill's passage.
Id.(citing Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying
23

TransgenderEmployment Discriminationunder Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER

423, 430 (2012)). Others' accounts argue that Smith amended the bill to ensure
that white women would be afforded the same legal protections as racial minorities.
Franklin,
supranote 24, at 1318 n. 36 (internal citations omitted).
2
6Id at 1332.
27 See id at 1330.
28 See id
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During this time period, "it was common for employers to
categorically exclude pregnant women from the workforce or impose
arbitrary restrictions on the place, time, and manner of their work. '29 At the
time of Title VI's passage, more than 30 percent of employers required
women to go on maternity leave before their seventh month of pregnancy
and 40 percent of employers fired women who became pregnant. 30 Even
the EEOC, in its early guidance on Title VII, issued opinion letters that
indicated excluding individuals with disabilities resulting from pregnancy
or childbirth and excluding maternity coverage from insurance plans did not
violate Title VII.31
However, by 1969, the Commission began arguing that employer
policies and practices which disparately treated "employees because of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions violate[d] Title VI. 32
In 1972, the Commission issued new guidance which stated that Title VII
barred the exclusion of pregnancy-related disability from employer benefit
plans.33 By 1975, a number of federal courts had 3 held that pregnancy
discrimination was sex discrimination under Title VII. 1
The Supreme Court disagreed. Where women could establish they
were just like a man, they were successful in suits alleging sex
discrimination. But, many courts still were unwilling to acknowledge that
Title VII might prohibit discrimination which sought to preserve culturally
ingrained stereotypes of what a woman's role in society should be - i.e.,
Emily Martin, Written Testimony of Emily Martin Vice President and General
Counsel National Women's Law Center, EEOC (Feb. 15, 2012),
L.
Joanna
(citing
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/martin.cfm
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J.
567, 595-600 (2010)).
30 123 CONG. REc. 29,385 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams).
31 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976) (citing EEOC Gen.
Couns. Opinion Letter, App. 721-22, 735 (Oct. 17, 1966)).
32 Peggy Mastroianni, Written Testimony of Peggy Mastroianni Legal Counsel,
EEOC, EEOC, (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-1512/mastroianni.cfm; Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg.
6,835 (Apr. 5, 1972) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (2016)).
33 Id The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued the same guidance
for interpreting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ., & Welfare, Higher Educ. Guidelines:Exec. Order 11246, at 12-13
(1972) (discussing Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, prohibition on discrimination
against pregnant women).
14 See, e.g., Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1097-99 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)); see also Commc'ns Workers of Am. v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Hutchison v.
Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1975); see also
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
29
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that of a wife and mother first and foremost. For example, in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta, the Supreme Court found that a prohibition against the
hiring of women with preschool age children, which did not apply to male
employees with preschool age children, was legally permissible sex
discrimination because "family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant
to job performance for a woman than for a man, could" justify "a bonafide
occupational qualification" in those circumstances.35 Thus, a woman could

not be treated differently from a man, unless the difference related to the
woman's reproductive role in society. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme
Court took this line of reasoning a step further when it held that a state
disability insurance system that denied benefits for disabilities resulting
from pregnancy did not discriminate on the basis of sex because pregnancy
was not a sex-based classification, and therefore, the denial of benefits did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36
Two years later, in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,37 the Court considered
the same question as it related to Title VII. The plaintiff in Gilbert
challenged her employer's disability benefits program which provided
benefits for all short-term disabilities except for pregnancy and related
conditions.38 Relying on the opinion and rationale of Geduldig, the
Supreme Court found that the disability plan did not violate Title Vii's
prohibition on sex discrimination because it distinguished between pregnant
and non-pregnant persons rather than between men and women.39 The
Court relied on formalistic reasoning to conclude that .'because of sex'
referred only to practices that divided men and women along the axis of
biological sex."4 ° Since the discrimination in Gilbert had to do with a
woman's reproductive capacity - one for which there can never be a male
comparator - the Court concluded there was no sex discrimination. "In its
insistence on formal equality, the Court ignored the long history of
discrimination against, and subordination of, women based on their
reproductive capacity.''
In its opinion, the Court claimed that it was
following the "traditional" understanding of sex discrimination.42
" Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (remanding to the
lower court to determine whether Marietta Corp. could establish sex was "a bona
fide occupational qualification").
36 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974).
37 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
38 Id at 127-28.
39Id. at 135 (citing Geduldig,417
U.S. at 496-97, n. 20).
40

41
42

Franklin, supranote 24, at 1363 (quoting Gilbert,429 U.S. at 145).
Stephens, supranote 16, at 414-15.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145; see Stephens, supra note 12, at 348 (discussing the

ways in which the concept of "tradition" is used by conservative politicians to limit
women's reproductive rights in the United States).
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The dissent rejected the majority's analysis, arguing that a rule that
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy "discriminates on account of sex;
for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the
female from the male."43 Congress adopted the dissenting Justices'
opinions when it passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),'
explicitly overturning the result and the reasoning of Gilbert.45 The PDA
amended Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
and defined its scope as reaching discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions[.], 4 6 The PDA also overturned the
Court's reasoning in Gilbert that a policy, which discriminates based on a
condition unique to women but which only impacts some women, is not a
47
form of sex discrimination.
Despite this, Courts have continued to use the Gilbert rationale to
permit sex discrimination where it relates to women's reproductive capacity
or medical conditions unique to women. 48 These cases focus on a
reproductive function which is unique to women (i.e., the ability to give
birth), and compare a particular sub-group of women (i.e., mothers) against
allother employees such that there is no evidence that men are treated more
advantageously than all women.49 This is despite the express abrogation of
43 Gilbert,429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2015); see 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977)

(statement of Sen. Williams) ("[T]he overall effect of discrimination against

women because they might become pregnant, or do become pregnant, is to relegate
women ingeneral, and pregnant women in particular, to a second-class status with
regard to career advancement and continuity of employment and wages.").
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676
(1983).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2015).
45

41

See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1342 (2015).

See In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp't Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir.
2007) (rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that denial of insurance coverage for
contraceptives was illegal sex discrimination under Title VII by finding that
contraceptives are not related to pregnancy and that men and women were treated
the same because the plan denied coverage to both men and women, despite the
fact that there exists no prescription contraceptive for men); see also Martinez v.
N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the PDA did
not prohibit discrimination based on breastfeeding and relying on the reasoning of
Gilbert).
41 See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 439 (6th Cir. 2004)
(examining breastfeeding within the employment context and concluding that none
of the district or appellate courts had determined that breastfeeding fell within the
scope of gender discrimination because of the absence of a comparable class); see
also Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir.
48

1997) ("[G]ender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no

10
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Gilbert by the PDA.50
For example, no plaintiff in the American legal system has ever
persuaded a court that breastfeeding discrimination violates Title VIl's
provision. 5 Courts following the reasoning of Gilberthave determined that
if employers discriminate against breastfeeding women, but not all women,
then it is not sex-based discrimination.52 Courts have also held that the
denial of insurance coverage for contraceptives is not related to pregnancy
for purposes of the PDA and is not sex discrimination under Title VII
where the plans denied coverage to both men and women, despite the fact
that there exists no prescription contraceptive for men.53 The erroneous
rationale in Gilbert can even be seen in the Supreme Court's most recent
54
pregnancy discrimination opinion, Young v. UPS.
In Young, the plaintiff alleged her employer discriminated against
her by failing to provide an in-job accommodation when her doctor limited
her ability to lift heavy boxes during the final months of her pregnancy
where UPS regularly provided modified work assignments to employees
who were injured at work or who had a disability under the ADA.55 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals utilized the pregnant versus nonpregnant
dichotomy found in Gilbert to conclude that there was no pregnancy
discrimination because UPS treated pregnant and non-pregnant employees
the same with respect to offering accommodations even though a normal
pregnancy does not result from a workplace injury and cannot be
corresponding subclass of members of the opposite gender. Such plaintiffs cannot
make the requisite showing that they were treated differently from similarly
situated members of the opposite gender").

"These cases settled on a specific idea about what does and does not count as sex
discrimination, and that idea has become so commonplace that courts act as if it
10

were embedded in the DNA of sex discrimination law." Zachary A. Kramer, The
New Sex Discrimination,63 DuKE. L.J. 891, 921 (2014).
"' Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439; see Nancy Ehrenreich & Jamie Siebrase,
Breastfeeding on a Nickel and a Dime: Why the Affordable Care Act's Nursing
Mothers Amendment Won't Help Low- Wage Workers, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 65,
74 (2014).
52 Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439.
53 See In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 942. But cf EEOC v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219-20 (D. Minn. 2001) (finding employees
had sufficiently alleged intentional disparate treatment and disparate impact in the
exclusion of contraceptives); see also Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 979, 981, 986 (E.D. Mo. 2003); see also Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,
141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wa. 2001) ("[T]he selective exclusion of
prescription contraceptives from defendant's generally comprehensive prescription
plan constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.").
54 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
55
1Id. at 1341.
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considered a disability under the ADA.5 6 On appeal, the U.S. Solicitor
General and Young both argued that if an employer accommodates any
non-pregnant employees, the employer must, under the PDA, accommodate
pregnant employees in the same fashion.57 The Supreme Court rejected this
analysis, finding that employers need not treat pregnant employees the
same as any other employee who is similar in his or her ability or inability
to work.58 Rather, in order to prove discrimination, the pregnant employee
must show that she was denied an accommodation, that the employer
accommodated other non-pregnant employees "similar in their ability or
inability to work[,]" and that any "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for
denying the accommodation was pretextual, such as where a facially neutral
policy imposed a "significant burden" on pregnant employees and "that the
employer's 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory' reasons [were] not 'sufficiently
strong' to justify the burden."59 In the example provided by the Court, a
successful plaintiff would have to show that her employer accommodated
"a large percentage of non-pregnant [employees] while failing to
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant [employces]. ' ° Thus, only
where a pregnant employee can meet the high burden of showing her
employer effectively provided a benefit to all non-pregnant employees and
denied that same benefit to multiple pregnant employees can a claim for
pregnancy discrimination be made. The Court's opinion in Young v. UPS
did not address the effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as
amended on pregnancy discrimination claims.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 61 emerged
from other Civil Rights Era legislation, including the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which banned discrimination on the basis of disability by recipients
of federal funds. 62 The ADA prohibits disparate treatment or disparate
impact discrimination against individuals with disabilities in many contexts,
including housing and employment, and in public places or private
businesses.63 Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination on
56
57
58

ld. at 1348-49.
1d. at 1351.
Id. at 1350.

59 1d

at 1354.
Id
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2015).
62 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (incorporated
throughout the ADA).
63 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
6
61

12

BUFFALO JOURNAL OFGENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XXIV

the basis of disability.' 4 The ADA also requires that employers provide
reasonable accommodations to employees with "known physical [and]
mental limitations" from their disabilities, assuming accommodation would
65
not pose an undue hardship.
In the Young case, UPS had a policy of providing modified duty
assignments to individuals with a disability under the ADA.66 UPS refused
to provide Young with an accommodation because she was not disabled
under the statute.67 Pregnancy alone is not considered a disability under the
ADA because pregnancy is not the result of a physiological disorder. 68 As
such, many courts have held that pregnancy-related conditions could only
be considered disabilities for purposes of the ADA in extremely rare and
extremely serious cases, while other courts have held that no condition
related to pregnancy could ever constitute an impairment sufficient to be
considered a disability. 69 In spite of the PDA, pregnant workers with
special needs that arise from their pregnancy, such as lifting restrictions or
the need for additional restroom breaks, may be treated disparately as
compared to other workers with the same special needs that arise from a
non-pregnancy related medical condition.
The ADA did not require
accommodation of these restrictions, and pregnant employees could be
terminated for failing to perform their jobs as demanded by their
6 See generally42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
65 Id at § 12112(b)(5)(A). To be entitled to an accommodation under the ADA, a
worker must demonstrate that she has a disability; that she can perform the
essential functions of the job with an accommodation; and that the employer has
been given notice of the need for accommodation. See Estades-Negroni v. Assocs.
Corp. of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Lyons v. Legal Aid
Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Mzyk v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
397 F. App'x 13, 16, n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 796-97 (7th Cir. 2005). For a discussion of the
interactive process required to provide a reasonable accommodation, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3) (2013). Title VII also requires reasonable accommodation to
prevent religious discrimination.
USERRA also provides for reasonable
accommodations of military personnel.
See generally Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§
4301-4335 (2006).
667 Youngv. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015).
_d.

To be considered disabled under the ADA, one must have a physical or mental
disorder which substantially limits one or more life activities. See 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(h) (2013); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1996) (the more restrictive
earlier version of the ADA applicable at the time Young brought her challenge in
Young v. UPS).
69
See, e.g., Conley v. UPS, 88 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
68
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employers.7 °
This was true until the passage of the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 (ADAAA) which greatly expanded the definition of a disability under
the Act, to include temporary and permanent medical conditions which
substantially impact one or more major life activities or major bodily
Under the amended Act, the question of whether an
functions.7"
individual's impairment constitutes a disability is interpreted broadly and is
not the focus of extensive analysis.72 Pregnancy itself is still not considered
a disability, but pursuant to the ADAAA and new guidance from the EEOC,
it is now accepted that an individual who has a pregnancy-related
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity (including a major
73
bodily function) is an individual with a disability protected by the ADA.
Therefore, an employee who develops a disability related to pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions may be entitled to a reasonable
accommodation, absent undue hardship, and cannot be discriminated
against on the basis of that disability.74
If the ADAAA had been in place at the time of Young's
employment at UPS, then UPS's policy of providing modified work
assignments to disabled employees with lifting restrictions should have
applied to her, as well. And, even if UPS did not have a policy of providing
modified work assignments to disabled employees, it still would have been
required to engage in the interactive process with Young to determine
whether allowing her to perform all of her other job functions, except lifting
heavy boxes (a rare event for her anyway), would have been a reasonable
accommodation.7 5 Because it would not have imposed a substantial or
undue burden on UPS to accommodate her in this fashion, such an
accommodation almost certainly would have been deemed reasonable.76
7o See Joan C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation
after theADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 102 (2013).
71 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101) (rejecting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2009).
72 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1.
73 Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discriminationand Related Issues, EEOC
(June 25, 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy guidance.cfm.
71 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h), (o)-(p); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9.
75 For a discussion of the interactive process required to provide a reasonable
accommodation, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
76 An employer need not accommodate an employee with a disability if doing so
42 U.S.C. §
would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship.
12112(b)(5)(A).
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Likewise, if Young had required some limited amount of leave time
due to pregnancy-related complications, that probably would have been
deemed a reasonable accommodation. However, the ADA, as amended,
would not have provided Young with an avenue to take leave to heal from a
normal delivery after the baby was born. Nor does it create a right for
Young to take time off from work after the baby was born to bond with or
care for the child.
3. Family and Medical Leave Act
Under Title VII, an employer is not required to provide pregnancyrelated or child care leave. As discussed infra, the ADA, as amended, only
requires leave if the employee has a disability and leave is a reasonable
accommodation.

The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)77 is the

nation's first, and only, federal law designed to address "the faultline
between work and family--precisely
where sex-based overgeneralization
'7 8
has been and remains strongest[.]
The FMLA applies to private employers with 50 or more
employees in 20 or more workweeks during the current or preceding
calendar year, as well as federal, state, and local governments.79 It allows
workers who have been employed a minimum of 12 months to take up to 12
weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave to care for newborns, newly adopted
or fostered children, and seriously ill family members, or to recover from
their own illnesses."0 In passing the FMLA, Congress expressly found that
due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our
society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking
often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the
working lives of women more than it affects the working
lives of men; and ...

employment standards that apply to

one gender only have serious potential for encouraging
employers to discriminate against employees and
81
applicants for employment who are of that gender.
7 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2015).
78 Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003) (holding the
FMLA's provision creates a private right of action against any employer that
interferes with FMLA leave applied to state employers).
79 29 U.S.C. §2611(4). In comparison, Title VII covers employers with 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the same
calendar year as, or in the calendar year prior to when, the alleged discrimination
occurred.
Title VII also covers governmental entities.
80
1d. §2612.
81Id § 2601(a).
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The FMLA was expressly designed to minimize sex discrimination and
promote equal employment opportunity by ensuring that leave is available
for eligible medical reasons, including maternity-related disability and
82
caregiving, and for compelling family reasons.
Since the FMLA's enactment in 1993, employees have taken
FMLA leave "more than 100 million times[,]" providing invaluable support
to those who have "needed time away from work to recover from serious
illnesses, welcome new babies, or care for an ill or injured family
member." 83 The FMLA is responsible for ensuring a woman can take leave
following the birth of her child without risking termination. It is also
responsible for changing cultural and workplace expectations as to the
abilities of mothers of young children to return to work and continue to
contribute meaningfully to the workforce. The FMLA has also impacted
84
what employees have come to expect of employer leave policies.
Unfortunately, about 40 percent of U.S. workers are ineligible for FMLA
protections because their employers do not employ at least 50 people, the
employee has not worked for that employer long enough, or the employee
works a reduced schedule and is unable to work the requisite number of
hours per year in order to earn protection. 85 Additionally, while the FMLA
offers a significant benefit of unpaid leave time to many, a substantial
number of eligible employees simply cannot afford to take unpaid time off
even where their health or family needs may require it.86 Nevertheless, the
FMLA is a crucial protection against female reproductive discrimination
because it creates the right to take leave for a serious medical condition,
including reproductive related health conditions, and to bond with a
newborn or newly adopted child. 87 Employers are required, except in
unusual circumstances, to return the employee to her former position upon
the conclusion of her leave and the employer is prohibited from retaliating
against an employee for exercising her FMLA leave entitlement. 88 The
FMLA is critical in insulating female employees against discrimination and
82

1d § 2601(b).
83 Debra L. Ness, On its 21st Anniversary, a New Guide to the FMLA, NAT'L
P'SHIP
FOR
WOMEN
AND
FAMILIES
(Aug.
15,
2014),

http://www.nationalpartnership.org/blog/general/on-its-21 st-anniversary-a-newguide-to-the-finla.html.
4Debra L. Ness, 200 Million Reasons to Support PaidFamily andMedicalLeave,
NAT'L

P'SHIP

FOR

WOMEN

AND

FAMILIES

(Feb.

5,

2015),

http://www.nationalpartnership.org/blog/general/200-million-reasons-to-supportpaid-family-and-medical-leave.htmil.
85 Id
86

87

Id

See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a).
88
Id §§ 2614-2615.
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protecting them from the natural outgrowth of "descriptive bias" against
mothers, "which reflects assumptions about how mothers will behave, and
prescriptive bias, which reflects [the] belief that pregnant women and
mothers do not belong in the workplace[.]" 89
4. Affordable Care Act
The most recent workplace protections for women can be found in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 9' Among many
provisions, Section 4207 of the ACA amended the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) "to require employers to provide reasonable break time for an
employee to express breast milk for her nursing child" each time an
employee has the need to express milk.9 Importantly, the employer must
provide a place, other than a bathroom, for the employee to express breast
milk. 2 As no court has found that the denial of an accommodation request
from a breastfeeding mother violates Title VII or the PDA, the ACA
provides a critical new statutory entitlement to protect mothers in the
workplace. 93
In addition to providing workplace protection to breastfeeding
mothers, the ACA helps to ensure women get an equal benefit of the
bargain of their employment when it comes to employer health insurance
coverage by mandating equal coverage and prohibiting sex discrimination
in healthcare. 94 "[E]mployees trade off wages against benefits and earn a
compensation package that includes both. In effect, employees 'buy'
benefits - including health insurance-with their wages." 95 Women are
often discriminated against in their wages in both their actual pay and the
benefits received from employer-provided health insurance coverage. In
Williams, supranote 70, at 102-03.
90 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(l)-(4) (2010). Currently, 24 states, Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia also have legislation setting workplace requirements related to
breastfeeding. See Lindsey Murtagh & Anthony D. Moulton, Working Mothers,
Breastfeeding,and the Law, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 217, table 3 (2011).
91 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(l)-(4); Break Time for Nursing Mothers, UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/nursingmothers/. The amendment went
into effect March 23, 2010. Id.
92 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B).
9' Franklin, supra note 24, at 1311, n.19 (citing Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
374 F.3d 428, 439 (6th Cir. 2004)).
9' See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012) (prohibiting a denial of benefits on the basis of sex
and prohibiting sex discrimination under any health program or activity which is
receiving Federal financial assistance).
95 Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering CorporateConscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
193, 203-04 (2015).
89
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enacting the ACA, Congress responded to evidence that women pay sixtyeight percent more in out-of-pocket health costs as compared to men, in
large part because they bear the costs of contraception and other
reproductive healthcare. 96 Under the ACA, Congress established minimum
coverage standards for various insurance plans, and one of the essential
benefits that must be provided under the ACA, without cost sharing, is
preventative service coverage, including annual gynecological exams or
The Department of Health and Human Services
mammograms. 97
developed comprehensive guidelines for determining what services must be
provided under the preventative care and screenings provision of the Act.
They included in the mandatory essential benefits preventative services
category all FDA approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures,
and patient education and counseling, for all women with reproductive
capacity. 98 In addition to addressing disparities in the cost of healthcare as
between men and women, Congress also intended to ban the longstanding
exclusion of services needed only by women from health care coverage and
ensure meaningful access to all methods of contraception as tools to ensure
greater equality for women. By mandating employer health insurance
coverage without cost sharing and banning discrimination in healthcare, the
ACA took another step in protecting women against reproductive
discrimination in the workplace.
The guarantees set out in Title VII, the PDA, the ADA, and the
FMLA have helped to ensure that female reproductive discrimination does
not force women out of work. The past forty years have seen a significant
shift as more women have continued to work during their childbearing
years, while they are pregnant, through later stages of pregnancy, and after
they have given birth. 9 Nevertheless, women still face discrimination at
work and as will be discussed infra, the ACA's attempt to reduce
discrimination against women in the workplace has ignited an expansive
backlash from conservatives pitting women's rights against a newly
invented corporate religious liberty interest.

96

See

INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR

19-20 (2011); see also Rachel Benson Gold, The
Need for and Cost of MandatingPrivate Insurance Coverage of Contraception, 1
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 5, 5 (1998).
9742 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012).
98 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2014).
WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS

9 In 2013, 70 percent of mothers with children under the age of 18 were in the
labor force. Women's Bureau, Latest Annual Data, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
15, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/
(last visited Aug.
LABOR
recentfacts.htm#mothers.
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B. Religious OrganizationExemptions to Anti-DiscriminationLaw
The U.S. Constitution recognizes the importance of religion in
America's history and in American society by protecting the right of free
exercise inthe First Amendment.1 °° Both statutory and case law provide
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws for religious employers in certain
circumstances to protect that right of free exercise and prevent religious
organizations from being forced to hire employees of alternative faiths.1"1
For example, Title Vn's prohibition against religious discrimination does
not apply "to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities."10 2 However, Title VII does not define "religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society," and the exemption is not
limited to actors performing religious duties. 0 3 The Supreme Court has
unanimously held that religiously affiliated non-profits and faith-based
service providers can make employment decisions based on religion, even
where the position related to nonreligious activity of the organization. 1°4
Anti-discrimination laws, on their face, do not permit religious
'0U.S. CONST. amend. I.

Title VII exempts any employer from its prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if those factors are "a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); see, e.g., Kern v.
Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (N.D. Tex. 1983), affid, 746 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1984) (allowing an employer to require that helicopter pilots convert to
Islam in order to be hired for air surveillance over Mecca because Saudi Arabian
law prohibited any non-Muslim from entering the holy area, a violation punishable
by death).
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
103 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this exemption by allowing a religiously
affiliated, non-profit entity to make employment decisions based on religion, even
if the position related to nonreligious activity of the organization. See Corp. of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987). Faith-based service
providers are also eligible for the exemption, but if they receive government
funding, the funds cannot be used to directly advance the organization's religious
practices. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002).
104Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
"[A]n entity is eligible for the section 2000e-1
exemption, at least, if it is organized for a religious purpose, is engaged primarily
in carrying out that religious purpose, holds itself out to the public as an entity for
carrying out that religious purpose, and does not engage primarily or substantially
in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts."
Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
101
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organizations to discriminate on any other basis protected by Title VII, the
PDA, or the ADA.1" 5 However, where an employee of a religious
organization asserts that discrimination is based on some other protected
characteristic, the organization may argue that the discrimination was in
fact based on religion.
In several cases, religious employers, particularly religious schools,
have invoked their beliefs to justify the termination of female employees
after they became pregnant."° In Hamilton v. SouthlandChristianSchool,
Inc., the school claimed that it did not violate Title VII in terminating a
teacher who became pregnant outside of marriage because of the school's
religiously based opposition to premarital marriage." 7 The Eleventh
Circuit overturned the district court's grant of summary judgment in the
school's favor, finding that the religious justification was likely pretext.18
In Boyd v. HardingAcademy ofMemphis, Inc., the Sixth Circuit accepted a
similar justification from a religious school where the employer claimed
that the termination was based on a violation of an organization policy
against extra-marital sex, stemming from the religion's teachings, rather
than the employee's pregnancy.'0 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's determination that the employer had not
discriminated against the employee on the basis of her pregnancy, holding
that the organization's religious policy rationale for termination was not
mere pretext, in part because the employer was able to proffer decades old
evidence that a male employee had been terminated under the same
"I As the PDA amended Title VII, the statutory exemptions apply to the PDA as

well. The ADA does not provide a statutory exemption for religious employers.
Moreover, if a religious entity receives federal funds, it is subject to the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits disability discrimination in federally
assisted programs. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
1"6 See, e.g., Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 350, 358-59
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding the religious school could not rely on religion as a

pretext for sex discrimination); see also Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F.
Supp. 802, 808-10 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (rejecting free exercise challenge to Title VII

by religious school who terminated a librarian for becoming pregnant outside of
marriage and concluding that it was sex discrimination because only women can
become pregnant).
107 Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1317-18, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2012) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the school).
108 Id. at 1319-21.
10 9 Boyd v. Harding Acad. ofMemphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 412,414 (6th Cir. 1996);
see Cynthia Brougher, CONG. RESEARCH SER., RS22745, RELIGION AND THE
WORKPLACE: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AS

IT

APPLIES

TO

RELIGION

AND

RELIGIOUS

ORGANIZATIONS

3-4

(2011),

http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1809&contextk
eyworkplace.
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policy.1

In other cases where an employee has alleged sex discrimination,
courts have refused to analyze the legal claims for fear of violating the
religious interpretation doctrine derived from the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause, which prohibits courts from examining religious
matters or doctrine."i '
In Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of
Wilmington, Delaware,Inc., et al, an employee was terminated for signing
a petition supporting the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade"' that
there is a constitutional right to legal abortion.'
The employee alleged
that even if her outside of work activities and personal feelings violated
church doctrine, male employees were treated less harshly for engaging in
similar conduct." 4 The court refused to examine her contention that she
was treated more harshly than male employees for fear that it would have to
examine the school's religious beliefs. Instead, the court found that the
only appropriate comparator would be a "male employee[] at Ursuline who
engaged in public pro-choice advocacy.""' 5 This severely limited the
employee's ability to show that she was discriminated against on the basis
6
of her sex and related reproductive activities.
The courts' hesitancy to analyze matters of religious interpretation
also can be seen in the judicial exemption of religious organizations from
anti-discrimination law as it applies to their ministerial employees. "[T]he
Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized . . . a 'ministerial
exception,"' arising from "the First Amendment, that precludes application
of [Title VIl] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a
religious institution and its ministers.""' 7 In 2012, the Supreme Court
110 Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414; see generally Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206
F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000) (explanation parenthetical needed). Contrast this with
EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365-70 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the religious school violated Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination by
giving family health benefits only to male employees because of the school's belief
that only men are "heads of households").
...See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130,
141 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887-88 (1990)
(indicating that the prohibition against judicial resolution of religious questions
should be understood to apply broadly and absolutely).
112 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113 Curay-Cramer,450 F.3d at 132.
14 1d at 139.

115

Id at 139, n. 7.
116 Id. (The Court makes explicit that the only appropriate comparator would be a
"male employee[] at Ursuline who engaged in public pro-choice advocacy.").
117 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
705 (2012) (citing Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578
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confirmed this exemption in Hosanna-TaborEvangelicalLutheran Church
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court
and School v. EEOC."8
unanimously held that the First Amendment provides a ministerial
exception that protects religious schools from retaliatory firing suits under
the Americans with Disabilities Act." 9 This decision expanded the scope
of religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause and departed from prior
precedent. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court had held that "free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability."" 2 However, in HosannaTabor, the Court recognized that the EEOC sued Hosanna-Tabor to enforce
"a valid and neutral law of general applicability," and denied Smith
"foreclose[d] recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion
Clauses[.]"''
The Court declined to define who might qualify as a minister under
the exception holding, "[e]very Court of Appeals to have considered the
question has concluded that the ministerial exception is not limited to the
head of a religious congregation, and we agree. We are reluctant, however,
to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a
minister."'' 22 The Court found Respondent teacher Cheryl Perich qualified
as a minister, despite the fact that she spent "six hours and fifteen minutes
(1st Cir. 1989); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-09 (2d Cir. 2008):
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-07 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800-01 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Tex.
Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 345-50 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225-27 (6th Cir. 2007); Schleicher v. Salvation
Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert
Southwest Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100-04 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v.
Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655-57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301-04 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC
v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
118 Hosanna-Tabor,132 S.Ct. at 707.
"I Id. The same reasoning found in Hosanna-Taborand the Title VII cases may
also apply to the FMLA. While the FMLA's statutory language contains no
exemptions for religious organizations, the ministerial exemption may allow a
religious organization to deny FMLA leave where it violates religious doctrine
such as an employer-church's denial of FMLA leave related to caring for the
employee-minister's same-sex spouse, stepchild (i.e. child of the employee's samesex spouse), or stepparent (i.e. parent of the employee's same-sex spouse). See,
e.g., Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help Roman Catholic Church, No. 05-CV0404, 2005 WL 2455253, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2005).
120 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
121 Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct at 707.
122

id
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of her seven hour day teaching secular subjects" and performed the same
religious tasks as lay teachers.' 23 Instead, the Court focused on the fact that
Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a minister by virtue of her title, "Minister
of Religion, Commissioned," that Perich had "a significant degree of
religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning," and that
Perich's job, like that of a lay teacher, involved "conveying the Church's
''
message and carrying out its mission. 24
In his concurrence, Justice Alito explained that a minister is "the
type of employee that a church must be free to appoint or dismiss in order
to exercise the religious liberty that the First Amendment guarantees. ' 125 In
Hosanna-Tabor,the Court expanded who the ministerial exception might
be applied to when it found fourth grade teacher Perich to be a minister
against whom the school could discriminate. It seems, in light of HosannaTabor, many employees of religious organizations could be subject to the
exception. While the Court did not rule whether the exception would bar
other types of suits, "courts of appeal [] have used the ministerial exception
to protect religious organizations from suits brought under all varieties of
employment-related law: intentional infliction of emotional duress, breach
of contract, age discrimination, Title VII hostile work environment, state
minimum wage law, and the Fair Labor Standards Act."'126 By establishing
the ministerial exception as a subset of the protections offered by the First
Amendment, Hosanna-Tabor limited Smith, significantly altering the
contemporary Free Exercise doctrine and revitalizing protections for
"decisions that affect the faith and mission of the church itself."'2 7
The question of whether Hosanna-Taborwas a church was not at

EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769,
780-781 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 694; see Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at
708.
124 Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 707-08.
125 Id at 716 (Alito, J., concurring).
126 Elliott Williams, Resurrecting Free Exercise in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
391, 399 (2013) (citing Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference,
978 F.2d 940, 940-41 (6th Cir. 1992) (intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1997) (breach of
contract); Skryzpczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 124041 (10th Cir. 2010) (age discrimination and Title VII hostile work environment);
Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1293 (9th
Cir. 2010) (state minimum wage law); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater
Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (FLSA)).
127 Williams, supranote 126, at 402 (internal quotations omitted).
123
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issue in that case and the Court did not define a "religious organization."'' 28
Nevertheless, the Court's broad language about protecting the "interest of
religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faiths,
and carry out their mission," opened the door to an even more expansive
application of the Free Exercise clause beyond churches to all religious
groups and the "right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments. ' 129 "[E]ven before Hosanna-Tabor, the courts of appeals
had applied the ministerial exception to hospitals, universities, and nursing
homes with religious missions."'3 ° The Supreme Court still went further
two years later in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby when it broadened the definition
of religious institution to include any organization, in whatever form, that
states it pursues religious goals."'
II. HOBBY LOBBY: FROM RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TO RELIGIOUS FORPROFIT CORPORATIONS

The ACA, like Title VII and other laws, established an exemption
for religious employers. 132 The ACA exempted "churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches[]" from complying
with the contraceptive mandate of the ACA. 13 3 This means that churches
can choose to be exempt from the requirement if they have religious
objections and their employees and their dependents will not have access to
some or all FDA approved contraceptive methods through their employer's
insurance plan. 34 The ACA also provided an accommodation for nonprofit
organizations that hold themselves out as religious organizations and which
135
object on religious grounds to the coverage of contraceptive services.
128

See generally, Zoe Robinson, What is a "Religious Institution"?, 55 B.C. L.

REV. 181, 204-22 (2014) (discussing the failure of the Court in Hosanna-Taborto
define "religious institution" and proposing a framework for distinguishing
religious organizations as those which have as their purpose: protection of
individual conscience, protection of group rights, and provision of desirable
societal
structures).
29
Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 706, 710.
130 Williams, supra note 126, at 400 (citing Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 361 (8th Cir. 1991); Petruska v. Gannon Univ.,
462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater
Wash., Inc. 363 F.3d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2004)).
131 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
132 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 1(a) (2014).
133 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §6033(a)(3)(A) (2015)).
134 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a).
135 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(1)-(3).
A religious employer, eligible for this
exemption, is required to certify that it is eligible for the exemption and notify the

24

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XXIV

Under the accommodation, religiously-affiliated nonprofits can opt-out of
providing contraceptive coverage by electing the accommodation. 13 6 The
insurance carrier for the nonprofit employer will continue to provide
contraceptive insurance coverage for the nonprofit's employees and their
7
dependents, but the nonprofit incurs no cost associated with the coverage.13
The ACA did not provide any such exemption or accommodation for for38
profit corporations.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties, Inc.,
along with many other for-profit corporate employers sued, arguing that the
government violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)'39 and
the First Amendment by requiring them to comply with the contraceptive
mandate. 140 In mounting their challenge, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood (collectively referred to as "Hobby Lobby") argued that the
contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their free exercise of religion,
guaranteed by RFRA and the First Amendment, by requiring it to provide,
facilitate, or pay for coverage for healthcare for its female employees when
that coverage was in direct conflict with their sincerely held religious
14 1
beliefs.
A. Defininga "Person"and the "ExerciseofReligion"
group health insurance issuer who will continue to provide coverage for the
employees without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on the organization, its
insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (c).
136 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 1(c).
137 Id

138 "The Senate voted down [a] so-called 'conscience amendment' which would
have enabled any employer or insurance provider to deny coverage based on its
asserted 'religious beliefs or moral convictions."' Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2789 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (passed in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) that neutral rules
of general applicability do not violate an individual's First Amendment rights).
140 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2759. The Court did not reach the First Amendment
arguments. Id at 2785.
41Id at 2765. Hobby Lobby, of course, was not required by law to provide any
healthcare coverage at all or meet the minimum healthcare coverage requirements
of the ACA. But, employers receive "significant tax benefits.., for compensating
employees with health benefits [in lieu] of wages." Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1453, 1485 (2015). "In seeking

religious exemptions[,] .

.

. employers effectively demand" these benefits, despite

offering insurance that does not meet the minimum requirements of the ACA, and
instead foist the cost of doing so on the government. Id.; see Sepper, supra note
95, at 219, n. 142 ("In the absence of the religious exemption, Hobby Lobby would
effectively lose the subsidy in the sense that the subsidy would be dwarfed by the
taxes for providing non-ACA-compliant insurance plans[.]").
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The RFRA restored the strict scrutiny analysis set out by the
Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner 142 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 143 free
exercise cases that preceded the Court's limiting decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.144 The strict scrutiny test adopted by RFRA provides:
"Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
' 45
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'
The RFRA expressly "provide[s] a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."'"
The Court's first task in the Hobby Lobby case was to decide
whether RFRA applied to for-profit employers. The RFRA protects 47a
"person's" exercise of religion, but the statute does not define "person.' '
The Hobby Lobby court referred to the Dictionary Act which defines the
word "person" to include corporations. 14' Relying on the near universal
acceptance that RFRA's use of the word "persons" includes non-profit
corporations, the Court determined "persons" should equally encompass
for-profit corporations.' 49 It concluded that -like religious non-profitsindividual
closely held, secular for-profit corporations equally "further[]
50
enterprise.
the
in
united
individuals
of
freedom"
religious
Thus, the Court in Hobby Lobby easily dispatched the question of
whether a for-profit corporate employer could be a "person" under RFRA.
It then analyzed whether a for-profit corporation could "exercise

374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that religious objectors are usually entitled to
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws and articulating the strict
scrutiny test).
143 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that individual's interests in the free exercise of
religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling
school attendance beyond the eighth grade).
1 494 U.S. at 879.
145 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
146 Id at § 2000bb(b).
147 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (citing 42
142

U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a)-(b)).
148 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (citing The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1
(2015)).
149 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 ("No known understanding of the term
'person' includes some but not all corporations... no conceivable definition of the
term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit
corporations.").
150

Id.
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religion."'' The Court was not persuaded by lower courts' holdings that a
for-profit corporation could not exercise religion for purposes of RFRA
because the primary objective of such a company is to make money. 152 Nor
was the Court persuaded by the lack of pre-Smith Free Exercise precedent
which did not grant religious freedom protection to for-profit
corporations.' 53 Instead, the Court determined that "there is no apparent
reason why [for-profit corporations] may not further religious
objectives, 154 and indeed, might be formed for the very purpose of
55
pursuing religious goals.
B. Applying RFRA
Having determined, for the first time, that a for-profit corporation is
a person capable of exercising religion, the Court set to work applying
RFRA's strict scrutiny test.156 First, the Court determined that the ACA's
"contraceptive mandate 'substantially burden[ed]' the exercise of
religion."'' 57 The Court found that the owners of Hobby Lobby held "a
sincere religious belief that life begins at conception[,]" and that they
"object on religious grounds to providing health insurance that covers
[certain] methods of birth control[.]"' 58 The Court then found this religious
belief was substantially burdened by the contraceptive mandate because
151 Id There was a circuit split as to whether a for-profit corporation can exercise
religion. See Sepper, supranote 95, at 196-97.
152 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770, n. 23.
153 Id. at 2772 (finding that RFRA went farther than the Court's pre-Smith Free
Exercise Clause precedent).
'4Id at 2771.
55
'
Id. at 2771-72. The majority in Hobby Lobby tried to limit this interpretation by
stating, in dicta, that it is unlikely that a large and/or publicly held corporation
would assert RFRA claims, if for no other reason than it is unlikely "that unrelated
shareholders . . . would agree to run a corporation under the same religious

beliefs[.]" Id. at 2774. However, this is precisely what has happened with
conscience exemptions in the healthcare industry.
See Elizabeth Sepper,
HealthcareExemptions and the FutureofCorporateReligious Liberty, in THE RISE
OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 305, 305, 313 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds.,

2016) ("Through leases, admitting privilege agreements, employment contracts,
and purchase agreements, healthcare systems require doctors to restrict the care
they provide patients based on religious or moral positions they may not share.").
156 See Sepper, supranote 155, at 44447; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(b).
15 7 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
158 Id
The sincerity of this religious belief went without question despite scientific
consensus that the birth control methods at issue are not "abortifacients," as alleged
by Hobby Lobby and seemingly accepted by the majority of the Court. See
Stephens, supra note 16, at 424, n. 169.
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Hobby Lobby would be subjected to financial penalties if it refused to
provide a health insurance plan compliant with the ACA and because it
might also be subjected to significant financial penalties if it declined to
offer a health insurance plan at all.'59 The Court refused to acknowledge
the attenuated nature between the asserted belief (abortion is wrong) and
the action required of the employer (offering a health care plan that covers
all FDA-approved contraceptives). Instead, the Court found that to analyze
whether the action was reasonably related to the proffered belief would
require the Court to impermissibly decide whether the belief asserted was
reasonable in violation of the religious interpretation doctrine.1 60 The Court
said that so long as the objecting companies "sincerely believe that
providing the insurance coverage demanded by the HHS regulations"
violates their religious beliefs, "it is not for us to say that their religious
beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our 'narrow function... in
this context is to determine' whether [a RFRA plaintiffs assertion that the
governmental action' at issue violates their religious beliefs] reflects 'an
honest conviction[.] '161
Next, the Court assumed, without deciding, "the interest in
guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods
is compelling within the meaning of RFRA.', 162 Finally, the Court applied
the last prong of the test to determine whether the mandate to provide an
insurance policy which includes coverage of all contraceptives approved by
the Food & Drug Administration was the least restrictive means to achieve
the government's compelling interest in ensuring cost-free access to
reproductive healthcare. 163 Taking into consideration that the Department
of Health and Human Services had already granted an accommodation from
the contraceptive mandate to religious non-profit organizations, the Court
found there was a less restrictive alternative which should be applied to
Hobby Lobby.1 " The Court, ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby, held that the
Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the
is not the least
exercise of religion provided for in RFRA, and the mandate
1 65
restrictive means of furthering the government's interest.

134 S. Ct. at 2776.
at 2778.
161 Id. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
162 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
163 Id. at 2782.
Id at 2780-82.
164
The Court did not reach Hobby Lobby's First Amendment
165 Id. at 2780.
argument. Id. at 2785.
119 Hobby Lobby,

160
Id
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C. Hobby Lobby ReligiousAccommodation Implications
The Gilbert rationale can be seen lurking within the Court's
reasoning in Hobby Lobby, allowing it to single out women for
discrimination with respect to their reproductive capacity and unique
medical needs. The Court "treat[ed] birth control as different and less
worthy of health coverage than other basic preventative health care
services[,]"' 66 by limiting its decision only to the contraceptive mandate,
and underlining that challenges to other types of mandated coverage, such
as vaccinations or blood transfusions, would fail.' 67 The Court clearly
regarded reproductive healthcare as less valuable than other healthcare
needs and indicated to employers they "may discriminate against women in
their medical care, but the Court's opinion should not be read to apply
where it might impact men or non-reproductive related issues."' 68 Focusing
on the free exercise of corporate religion allowed the majority to ignore the
169
sex discrimination that underlies that free exercise.
In doing so, the Court greatly expanded the reach of religious
exceptionalism and created a new religious liberty interest for corporations
which could have a wide-reaching impact on anti-discrimination laws
promulgated to protect women. In Hobby Lobby, "[f]or the first time, the
Supreme Court exempted for-profit businesses from employee-protective
law in the name of religion."17 Not only did the Supreme Court establish a
religious liberty doctrine for businesses, but it also found that a for-profit
corporation can be exempted from a neutral regulation, generally applicable
to all employers. Contrast this with the Court's prior holding in United
States v. Lee, 7 ' where it rejected a request for a religious-based exemption
for for-profit employers from social security payments due to the burdens
on employees, and its holding in Newman v. Piggie Park172 describing as
"patently frivolous," the claim that anti-discrimination laws interfered with
the religious liberty of the Piggie Park barbecue chain and its owner.
In expanding the concept of who can exercise religion, the Court
opened the door for for-profit employers to claim that Title VIl's exemption
for religious organizations, which allows them to discriminate against
166 Gretchen Borchelt, The Hobby Lobby Majority Opinion: It Can't Be Sex
DiscriminationifWomen Aren 'tin the Picture,NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER
(July 8, 2014), http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/hobby-lobby-majority-opinion-itcant-be-sex-discrimination-if-women-arent-picture.
167 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
168 Stephens, supra note 16, at 425.
169 See Borchelt, supranote 166.
170 Sepper, supra note 19, at 28.
171 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982).
172 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402, n. 5 (1968).
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employees of a different religious background, should be applied where the
religion of a corporation or its shareholders conflicts with a trait,
characteristic, or behavior of an applicant or an employee. The Hobby
Lobby case also might be used to argue that the ministerial exception set
forth in Hosanna-Taboris broad enough to cover corporate officers and
other high-ranking employees in for-profit corporations which have a
"religious objective."' 73 Indeed, the Court set the stage for many new
conflicts over the reach of RFRA as applied to prohibitions against sexbased discrimination in employment.
I. APPLYING HOBBY LOBBY: EMPLOYER CONSCIENCE
VERSUS WOMEN'S RIGHTS

The Supreme Court majority in Hobby Lobby and other courts
faced with challenges to the contraceptive mandate across the country
missed an opportunity to acknowledge and hear from the women who
would be harmed by an exemption or accommodation from the mandate. 74
While the majority in Hobby Lobby acknowledged RFRA's application
"must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation
may impose on nonbeneficiaries[,]"' 7 5 the Court failed to consider the
dignitary harm that it has previously recognized in discrimination cases,
such as the dignitary harm women suffer because their reproductive
healthcare is treated differently than all other healthcare; the harm inherent
in determining that an employer's religious beliefs should outweigh a law
of general applicability when that law works to the benefit of women; or the
76
enduring harm to equal rights jurisprudence the decision could have.
Furthermore, as a result of the Hobby Lobby decision, closely held
corporations with religious objections to contraceptive coverage were
completely exempt from the contraceptive mandate until the federal
government was able to issue new regulations more than a year later which
extended the accommodation available to religiously affiliated nonprofit
employers to closely held for profit corporations for the 2016 insurance
plan year, meaning that thousands of employees and their dependents went

See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
See Sepper, supra note 95, at 211. "The fact that coverage will, in some cases,
be provided by another entity does not undo the discrimination." Id.
175 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781, n. 37.
176 The majority in Hobby Lobby seemed to believe that Hobby Lobby's female
employees would experience "zero" harm because it believed the government
should pay for their reproductive healthcare coverage as a "lesser restrictive
means." See id at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'

174
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without contraceptive coverage for eighteen months.'77
By failing to affirmatively decide that the government has a
compelling interest in women's reproductive healthcare or ending
discrimination in healthcare costs, the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby had
the adverse effect of implying that the Court might not find such a thing to
be true if challenged in another case.' 78 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
warned that RFRA could be used to challenge generally applicable laws
which prohibit discrimination and referenced a number of cases where
business owners sought to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and sexual
orientation in public accommodations and in hiring.'79 Justice Alito
responded to this criticism in the majority opinion stating,
The principal dissent raises the possibility that
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race,
might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal
sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The
Government has a compelling interest in providing an
equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without
regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are
precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal. 8 °
Justice Alito strongly conveys that a RFRA challenge to Title VII's
prohibition on race discrimination would surely fail. However, his
omission of any reference to sex discrimination, prohibited primarily by the
same statute, is greatly concerning considering this was a case about sex
discrimination. His failure to speak affirmatively seems to indicate that the
government's interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce without regard to sex is not as compelling and that a RFRA
challenge to a claim of sex discrimination in employment could be
177

See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(4); see also Laurie Sobel & Alina Salganicoff,

Round 2 on the Legal Challenges to Contraceptive Coverage: Are Nonprofits
"Substantially Burdened" by the "Accommodation"?, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION (Nov. 2015), http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/round-

2-on-the-legal-challenges-to-contraceptive-coverage-are-nonprofits-substantiallyburdened-by-the-accommodation/.
178 "In making an assumption[,] ...the majority [avoids] any discussion of the
benefits of birth control to women, including ... its value in furthering women's

equality by addressing discrimination in health care and promoting women's social
and economic opportunities. In fact, the majority opinion puts these interests in
quotations, suggesting that they are questionable or invalid." Borchelt, supra note

166.
"' Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2804-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180 Id at 2783.
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successful.
The Supreme Court has the opportunity to address this concern in
2016. Many schools, hospitals, and other religiously-affiliated nonprofit
organizations have challenged the accommodation to the contraceptive
mandate, arguing that the notice requirement to elect an accommodation to
the contraceptive coverage requirement substantially burdens their religious
exercise because the notice facilitates the provision of insurance coverage
for contraceptive services and "allow[s] their health plans to be used as a
vehicle to bring about a morally objectionable wrong."' 81 On March 23,
2016, the Court held oral argument on seven consolidated cases challenging
the accommodation and the contraceptive mandate itself."8 In deciding the
consolidated accommodation cases, the Court could reach a decision as to
whether the government's interest in ending sex discrimination in
healthcare and in employment is compelling and whether that interest1 83is as
compelling as the government's interest in ending race discrimination.
Since the Hobby Lobby decision, the majority's reasoning in Hobby
Lobby and RFRA have been used to argue for greater religious
accommodations or conscience exemptions in a variety of circumstances.
Litigants have argued that the protections provided for in RFRA should
exempt them from laws that protect women, LGBTQ individuals, and
students from discrimination, laws which allow employees to unionize, and
18

Emergency Application to Recall and Stay Mandate or Issue Injunction Pending

Resolution of Certiorari Petition at 17, Zubik v. Burwell,_ U.S. (2016) (No.
14-1418); see Geneva Coll. v. Health & Human Servs. Sec'y, 778 F.3d 422 (3d

Cir. 2015), cert.granted,84 U.S.L.W. 3096 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 15-191); see
also E.Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015), cert.granted,
84 U.S.L.W. 3050 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 15-35); see also Little Sisters of the
Poor Home v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted,84 U.S.L.W.

3056 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 15-105); see also Priests for Life v. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted,83 U.S.L.W. 3918
(U.S. Nov. 6,2015) (No. 14-1453).
182 Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d 442, cert.granted; E. Tex. Baptist Univ., 793 F.3d 449,
cert. granted;Little Sisters, 794 F.3d 1151, cert. granted; Priestsfor Life, 772 F.3d
229, cert. granted.

183 Alternatively, the Court may decide that the accommodation itself substantially
burdens the organizations' religious exercise and that the accommodation is not the
least restrictive means of achieving the government's compelling interest. The
Court could also decide that the accommodation substantially burdens the

organizations' religious exercise and that the government has no compelling

interest in providing contraceptive coverage. If the Court reaches either conclusion
and grants an exemption from the mandate to religious nonprofits, then such an
exemption would necessarily have to apply to religious for-profit corporations, and
the Court might very well strike down the contraceptive mandate in its entirety.
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even criminal laws.1" For example, following the Court's ruling in Hobby
Lobby, a military judge issued an order blocking female guards at
Guantanamo Bay from performing their regular duties after a detainee
claimed that having female guards escort and shackle him violated his free
exercise of religion under RFRA."8 5 "The judge's interim order accepted
the idea that one person's beliefs could determine which jobs women are
allowed to have, undermining their right to be free of discrimination in the
work place."186
In another case, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB), relying on RFRA and the Hobby Lobby decision, demanded
exceptions from Executive Order 11246 which prohibits U.S. government
contractors from engaging in discriminatory hiring and employment
practices.' 87
The USCCB argued that they should be allowed to
discriminate against applicants and employees on the basis of sex as it
relates to birth control coverage, abortion, sexual orientation, and gender
identity. 188 Likewise, the Family Research Council and Alliance Defending
Freedom issued a letter in which they stated they would not abide by the
D.C. Reproductive Health Non-Discrimination Amendment Act, which
prohibits discrimination against employees based on their personal
reproductive health care decisions, including decisions about whether and
when to utilize birth control or abortions, because the groups believed the
law violated RFRA. 8 9 It seems likely that RFRA will also be used by for1' The Hobby Lobby "Minefield": The Harm, Misuse, and Expansion of the
Supreme Court Decision, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, 1, 1 (2015),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlchobbylobbyreport2O15.pdf.
185 See Interim Order at 1-2, United States v. Abd Al Hadi Al-Iraqi (Military
Comm'ns Trial Judiciary Guantanamo Bay Nov. 7, 2014) (No. AE021B).
186 The Hobby Lobby "Minefield," supra note 184, at 3-4. "The female guards []
filed an EEO complaint" alleging sex discrimination. Id.at 4.
187See id.at 4 (citing Memorandum from United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops to the Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs (Mar. 30, 2015)
(http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/CommentsDiscrimination-Basis-of-Sex-March-2015.pdf)); see also Kayla Higgins, Stemming
the Hobby Lobby Tidal Wave: Why RFRA Challenges to Obama'sExecutive Order
ProhibitingFederal Contractorsfrom Discriminatingagainst LGBT Employees
Will Not Succeed, 25 B.J. GENDER L. SOC. POL'Y (2016) (arguing the executive
order does not impose a substantial burden and the government has a compelling
interest in workplace equality).
188 Memorandum from United States Conference of Catholic Bishops to the Office
of
Fed.
Contract
Compliance
Programs
(Mar.
30,
2015)
(http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/CommentsDiscrimination-Basis-of-Sex-March-2015.pdf).
189 The Hobby Lobby "Minefield," supranote 184, at 4 (citing Casey Mattox et al.,
Joint Statement Regarding District of Columbia Reproductive Health Non-
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profit employers, like Hobby Lobby, to argue they should be exempt from
laws which prohibit employment discrimination against women in much the
same way they argued they should be exempt from the contraceptive
mandate. The next section explores whether RFRA would apply in this
context.
A. Does RFRA Apply in a CivilDiscriminationSuit?

The RFRA allows "[a] person whose religious exercise has been
burdened in violation of this section [to] assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government." 1" Because the statutory language specifically references
relief against the government, there has been some dispute as to whether the
language in the statute limits RFRA claims to suits where the government is
a party, or whether it can be used as a defense in civil litigation between
private parties. In Hankins v. Lyght, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that in a discrimination suit between private parties, a defendant can
argue that RFRA prohibits the application of the anti-discrimination statute
at issue.1 91
In Hankins, a clergyman who had been forced into retirement
alleged discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).' 92 The ADEA is enforced by the EEOC in the
same way as Title VIIPDA and the ADA. A claimant must exhaust his or
her administrative remedies by first filing a Charge of Discrimination with
the EEOC.1 93 The EEOC will attempt to mediate the claim and then it will

DiscriminationAmendment Act (May 4, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/
RHNDAstatement.pdf.
190
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c).
191Hankins

v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2006).

92Id.at
'

99.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; see also EEOC Compliance Manual, EEOC

(last
visited
Aug.
1, 2015),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
threshold.html#N_169_ (Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, a charging
party must file a charge with the EEOC within either 180 days or 300 days of the
alleged unlawful employment practice, depending upon whether the alleged
violation occurred in a jurisdiction that has a state or local fair employment
practices agency (FEPA) with the authority to grant or seek relief. Where the
alleged violation arose in a state or locality that does not have a FEPA with the
authority to grant relief, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of
the violation. Where the alleged violation arose in a state or locality that does have
a FEPA, a charge must be filed with the EEOC or a FEPA within 300 days of the
violation. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear discrimination claims
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investigate the Charge. 94 Once the EEOC concludes its investigation, it
may reach a determination that the employer discriminated against the
employee.'9 5 If so, the EEOC may take up the case and attempt to reach
conciliation with the employer. 196 If conciliation fails, the EEOC will file a
discrimination complaint.1 97
Alternatively, after it completes its
investigation, the EEOC may decline to take up the case either because it
does not make a discrimination determination or because it does not have
the resources to pursue the claim. 9 ' In the latter case, the employee is
issued a Right to Sue Letter and may file a suit against the employer in
federal court. 9 9 In Hankins, the Second Circuit found that declaring RFRA

inapplicable to private discrimination suits would render defendants in
discrimination cases subject to different legal standards, depending on
whether the plaintiff was the United States (i.e., the EEOC) or a private
person." 0 In the ACA cases, the Department of Justice also has taken the
position that RFRA can be raised as a defense in suits brought by private
parties. °1
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, have held that
20 2
Congress did not intend RFRA to apply in suits between private parties.
In GeneralConference Corporationof Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, a
trademark infringement case, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Hankins by
explaining that "the Hankins majority limited its holding to the application
of RFRA vis-A-vis federal laws that can be enforced by private parties and
which allege a violation of the ADA, Title VIIPDA, or the ADEA (among others)
until
the plaintiff has exhausted his or her administrative remedies.).
194
See EEOC Compliance Manual, supranote 193.
195 See id

'9 See id
197 See id

'98 See id
1991d
200 Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
201 "[]If plaintiff were sued by a plan participant or beneficiary in the future,
plaintiff, in its defense of such an action, would have an opportunity to raise its
contention that the contraceptive coverage requirement violates the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act[.]" Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss at 4, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 1201169).
202 See generally Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617
F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015). A second panel of the Second Circuit has
also called the opinion in Hankins into question. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520
F.3d 198, 203-04, n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining in dicta, "we do not understand
how [RFRA] can apply to a suit between private parties, regardless of whether the
government is capable of enforcing the statute at issue[]").
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the government. . . . There is no EEOC-like agency that can bring
trademark-enforcement actions., 20 3 Rather, the McGill court read the
statutory reference to relief against a government as limiting RFRA to
proceedings involving the government. 2 °' The Sixth Circuit pointed out
that (i) RFRA requires the government to demonstrate that the statute's
"compelling governmental interest" test is satisfied, (ii) "the findings and
purposes sections of RFRA" similarly and repeatedly refers to the
government, and (iii) the "RFRA's legislative history supports" a
conclusion that the statute should not apply to private parties.2 °5
As McGill acknowledged, the nature of a discrimination claim
brought under federal laws enforced by government agencies is
fundamentally different than a claim brought under trademark law.2 6 A
claim brought under Title VII, the PDA, or the ADA could be brought by
the EEOC, or if the EEOC elects not to act, by a private plaintiff stepping
into the shoes of the government to enforce federal law. It is clear that a
defendant can raise RFRA in an anti-discrimination suit where the EEOC
argues the case on behalf of the claimant. 20 7 Barring the employer from
utilizing RFRA defense where the EEOC declines to act, could mean that
an employer will be subject to differing obligations as to its employees
depending upon the resources or the strategic choices of the EEOC. In
order to avoid disparate outcomes, the same rule of law should apply
regardless of whether the EEOC seeks to enforce an employee's private
remedy or the employee acts to enforce his or her private remedy under
Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws enforced by the EEOC.2 °8

McGill, 617 F.3d at 411.
Id at 410.
20 5
Id at 410-11.
206 See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227
F.3d 1110, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the likelihood that Congress did not
envision that RFRA would apply to copyright suits between private parties).
207 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (preCity ofBoernes, analyzing RFRA and determining that it precluded application of
Title VII to a nun alleging gender discrimination).
208 Note that under the pre-Smith case law, Free Exercise claims, similar in nature
to RFRA claims, would have applied to private lawsuits. See Eugene Volokh,
Many Liberals' (Sensible)Retreatfrom the Old Justice Brennan/ACLUPositionon
(Apr. 1, 2015),
POST
WASHINGTON
Religious Exemptions, THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/01/manyliberals-sensible-retreat-from-the-old-justice-brennanaclu-position-on-religiousexemptions/.
203

204
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B. Should a RFRA Defense be Successful?
Pursuant to the holdings of Hobby Lobby, a for-profit corporation
can now seek an exemption under RFRA from anti-discrimination laws if
its owners have religious objections. Assuming that a RFRA defense could
be used by employers to defend discriminatory employment decisions, such
a defense should not be successful. To meet the substantial burden test
outlined in Hobby Lobby, all the business' owners need to do is truthfully
assert that they believe their faith calls on them not to employ persons who
have certain characteristics or engage in certain conduct. Then, the
government or the single plaintiff stepping into the shoes of the government
must show that the government has a compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination in employment and that the anti-discrimination prohibition at
issue meets the "exceptionally demanding" least-restrictive-means test.2° 9
The RFRA defense in the employment context should not be successful
because any religious beliefs held by for-profit employers are not
substantially burdened by current federal anti-discrimination law. Even if
that were the case, the government has a compelling interest in prohibiting
sex discrimination in employment and current law is the least restrictive
means of effectively ending sex discrimination in employment.
Private employers are not substantially burdened by antidiscrimination law. In Hobby Lobby, the majority failed to analyze whether
the petitioners' sincerely held beliefs were substantially burdened by the
neutral application of the ACA. Instead, it conflated the determination that
the petitioners had a sincerely held belief with the Court's required inquiry
into whether the law substantially burdened that belief. The majority
simply accepted as fact the petitioner's assertion that the law substantially
burdened their beliefs because if they failed to conform to the law they
could face significant financial penalty. 21 ° The majority's conclusion that
Hobby Lobby's beliefs were substantially burdened cannot be reconciled
with the Court's pre-Smith jurisprudence which required the free exercise
claimant to show that he or she was forced to violate a command or
prohibition of the claimant's faith.2 11 Pre-Smith, the Court refused to grant
2

' Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014).

210 Id. at 2775-76.

See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that the government did
not impair Native Americans' free exercise of religion by assigning a Native
American child a Social Security number despite the Native Americans' stated
belief to the contrary); see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988) (permitting the federal government to build a logging road through
government land that Native Americans had long held sacred and used for worship
because the severe adverse effects on the Native Americans' practice of their
211
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exemptions where the effect on free exercise was indirect, even where it
an
made religious practice much more difficult, particularly if granting
21 2
exemption would interfere with the government's ability to operate.
Rather than focusing on the burden of potential financial penalties
imposed on Hobby Lobby if it broke the law, Justice Ginsburg analyzed
whether complying with the law itself would substantially burden Hobby
Lobby's religious beliefs. 213 Concluding it would not, Justice Ginsburg
opined, "the connection between the families' religious objections and the
contraceptive coverage requirement is too attenuated to rank as
substantial."2 4 While private employers may be burdened directly by
antidiscrimination laws, that burden is not substantial when weighed against
the employer's election to engage in a secular, for-profit enterprise. Antidiscrimination laws are limited so they do not reach small employers, such
as family businesses where the application of anti-discrimination law might
legitimately create a serious and significant disruption. 215 For others to
which the law applies, an employer's sincerely held beliefs, whether they
sound in a recognized religion or purely as a matter of personal
conviction,21 6 are not unduly burdened by the uniform prohibition of
discrimination applied to all private employers. 2 17 Requiring a private
employer "to do something in the commercial sphere that is required of
nearly all such businesses ordinarily does not require the owner to abandon
his religious tenets, to endorse conduct or express an opinion that is
beliefs, or to modify his private conduct as a
contrary to his religious
218
religious observant.
Even assuming arguendo that an employer's sincerely held beliefs
were substantially burdened by anti-discrimination law, a RFRA challenge
in the employment context should still fail. Given the long history of sex
discrimination in this country, the government has a compelling interest in
promoting women's equal citizenship in American society, whether that is
religion was incidental and not out of any attempt to coerce Native Americans to
act in violation of their beliefs).
212

213

See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 465.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

214 Id

Anti-discrimination laws, such as Title V1IPDA and the ADA, only apply to
employers with 15 or more employees.
216 "Separating moral convictions from religious beliefs would be of questionable
legitimacy." Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789, n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-58 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
result)).
217 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (stating in dictathat "prohibitions on racial
discrimination [in hiring] are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal").
218 Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
215
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in the area of public accommodation, equal access to governmental
programs, or in private employment. Women have been excluded "from
key sites of citizenship for most of American history ... accomplished in
significant part by requiring that they occupy the role of caregivers, not
breadwinners." 219 Reproductive freedom, such as the ability to control
whether and when to bear children, has increased the ability of women in
the U.S. to become more educated, to participate in the labor force, to
increase their average earnings, and to help close the wage gap between
men and women. 22 The Supreme Court has recognized "[t]he ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation
221
has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."
The Supreme Court also has clearly held that the government has a
compelling interest in ending sex discrimination. 222 In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Supreme Court held that Minnesota's prohibition of
gender discrimination in places of public accommodation did not violate the
Jaycees' First Amendment rights because the rights arising from the First
Amendment, there, the right to associate, are not "absolute," and that
"[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive[.]" 223 The
Court explained,
this Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on
archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs
and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor under
stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their
actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Compelling Interests and Contraception,47
CONN. L. REv. 1025, 1037 (2015).
220
See generally Jennifer J. Frost & Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Reasonsfor Using
Contraception: Perspectives of US. Women Seeking Care at Specialized Family
PlanningClinics, 87 CONTRACEPTION J. 465 (April 2013).
221 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
222 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see also Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); see also
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (noting that fundamental
principles are violated when "women, simply because they are womenf" are
denied "equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society
based on their individual talents and capacities[]"); see also Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 85 P.3d 67, 92 (Cal. 2004)
("The [contraceptive coverage law] serves the compelling state interest in
eliminating gender discrimination.").
219

223 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
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individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life ...
Assuring women equal access to [leadership skills,
business contacts, and employment promotions] clearly
furthers compelling state interests.224
Courts have also recognized that prohibitions on sex discrimination
in employment serve a compelling state interest. In McLeod v. Providence
Christian School, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that a
religious school's policy of not employing on a full-time basis women with
preschool-age children was an obvious violation of Title VII because there
was no similar policy which prohibited male employees with preschool-age
children from full-time work.225 The school challenged the application of
Title VII, alleging that it violated the school's First Amendment right to
religious expression.226 The court declined to grant an exemption to Title
VII, holding "[j]ust as ending employment discrimination is a compelling
state interest, elimination of discrimination on the basis of sex is a
compelling state interest. [Title VII] is expressly designed to further these
purposes.,227 Likewise, other anti-discrimination laws which have as their
purpose and effect to end sex discrimination in employment, such as the
PDA, the ADA, and the FMLA, serve this compelling state interest.
Further, there is no less restrictive means to accomplish the equal
opportunity goals set forth in anti-discrimination law. As Justice Ginsburg
pointed out in her dissent in Hobby Lobby, "[f]ederal statutes often include
exemptions for small employers, and such provisions have never been held
to undermine the interests served by these statutes., 228 Likewise, the fact
that there currently exist some exemptions from anti-discrimination law for
religious employers should not open the floodgates to a tidal wave of
exemptions that would eradicate the purpose and effect of antidiscrimination law. Religious business owners are not different than any
other business owner "who must, in compliance with a variety of statutory
mandates, take actions that may be inconsistent with their" personal
224

Id at 625-26.
McLeod v. Providence Christian Sch., 408 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987).

225

226

227

Id
Id at 151-52; see generally McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d

844 (Minn. 1985) (holding that the state Human Rights Act imposed a burden on
the business owners' free exercise of religion but that the burden was justified by
the state's compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment).
228 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2800 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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beliefs. 2 9 Thus, even where a private employer may experience some
burden by being forced to comply with statutes which prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, that burden should be viewed as minimal
when weighed against the employer's decision to enter into a secular, forprofit business, or it should be outweighed by the state's compelling interest
in eradicating sex discrimination in employment which "cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive[.]" 23
IV. TaE IMPACT OF EMPLOYER CONSCIENCE EXEMPTIONS
Hobby Lobby represents a departure from the general rule that
"[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a
matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes
which are binding on others in that activity."23' 1 The law at issue in Hobby
Lobby sought to mitigate sex discrimination in healthcare by reducing the
amount women pay out of pocket to cover reproductive related healthcare.
It also sought to remedy the harm caused by employers who, by failing to
offer adequate insurance, imposed externalities on their employees, other
employers (as workers with inadequate insurance enrolled in spousal plans),
and society at large (as workers turned to public insurance).232 Instead of
upholding this generally applicable law, the majority of the Court created a
corporate religious liberty doctrine that might exempt for-profit employers
from generally applicable anti-discrimination laws.
Courts have previously recognized a religious exemption "cannot

Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 859 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).;
see McLeod, 408 N.W.2d at 148-52 (holding that the application of Title VII did
not unduly interfere with the school's religious belief that "a woman's place is in
the home raising children"). The court went on to find that Title VII "employs the
least [restrictive] means to further" the state's compelling interest in eradicating sex
discrimination. Id. at 152. Indeed, there is no less restrictive means of ending sex
discrimination in employment then laws which expressly prohibit it (Title
VII/PDA) and laws which expressly prohibit discrimination and retaliation against
women who engage in reproductive activity (FMLA, ADA). There is no
alternative which will guarantee participation in the economy or prevent the
dignitary harms imposed by sex discrimination. See Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
229

230 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.

11 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) ("Among the pathmarking preSmith decisions RFRA preserved is UnitedStates v. Lee[" Hobby Lobby, 134 S.
Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
232 Sepper, supranote 141, at 1463.
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be accommodated 233 with prevention of discrimination, and an exemption
"would seriously undermine the means chosen by Congress to combat
discrimination."2 '34 The employer conscience exemption set forth in Hobby
Lobby should not be expanded to accommodate new religious objections to
anti-discrimination law. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court
emphasized "the importance, both to the individual and to society, of
removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and social
integration that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups,
'
Anti-discrimination laws have the aim of remedying
including women."235
the societal and individualized harms caused by employers who unfairly
treat women based on stereotypes about their role in society.236
Many religious beliefs form the basis for the sex stereotypes that
have held women back from equal treatment in society and which have
historically been used to justify discrimination in the workplace.237
Religious beliefs have long been invoked to justify restrictions on women's
roles in employment and to control their sexuality, often because of the
belief that it is "the law of the Creator" that "[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman [is] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother." 238 These beliefs are embedded in American culture and can be
seen whenever the courts turn a blind eye to the reality that discrimination
on the basis of contraceptive use, abortion, pregnancy, or any other female
reproductive function, is sex discrimination.2 39 Anti-discrimination laws
which have challenged those stereotypes and opened opportunities to those
233 Bob Jones Univ. v. United
234 EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626

States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S.

912(1981).
235 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)
(per curiam)).
See generally Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity?
Religious Exemptions to PublicAccommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 705, 708236

16 (2014) (arguing harm to dignity from accommodations in anti-discrimination
laws); see also Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations
Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015) (countering
four rationales for religious accommodations).
237 Brief Amici Curiae of Julian Bond, the ACLU et al. in Support of the
Government, at 20-26, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356).
238 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); see
generally Sarah M. Stephens, The Searchfor Authenticity and the Manipulationof
Tradition: Restrictionson Women's Reproductive Rights in the UnitedStates and
Egypt, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 325 (2013) (analyzing how politicians use

religious rhetoric to limit women's reproductive rights and access to reproductive
healthcare).
239 See supraPart I.A.; see also Stephens, supranote 16, at 414-15.
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who have historically been excluded should not be undermined by religious
accommodations that will once again legitimize discrimination against
women.
V. CONCLUSION

The creation of an employer conscience exemption in Hobby Lobby
has opened the door for employers to avoid the promise of equality set forth
in anti-discrimination laws. Accommodating for-profit employers in this
way will undermine the gains achieved by anti-discrimination law over the
last fifty years since their enactment, ripping hard won gains from the hands
of women who have still not yet achieved equality in the workplace. In
order to stop the tide of this new corporate religious liberty interest, courts
must distinguish the majority's reasoning in Hobby Lobby and recognize
that the state's compelling interest in ending sex discrimination outweighs
the arguable burden on an employer's beliefs. For employers who have
willingly entered the marketplace, offering equal employment opportunities
to women simply must be the cost of doing business.

